

# IX JORNADAS STIC CCN-CERT

DETECCIÓN E INTERCAMBIO, FACTORES CLAVE

Madrid, 10 y 11 de diciembre 2015

## APT. Evolución de las tácticas. Situación de España en el panorama europeo



CENTRO CRIPTOLÓGICO NACIONAL





- Álvaro García
- FireEye
- [alvaro.garcia@fireeye.com](mailto:alvaro.garcia@fireeye.com)

## ÍNDICE


- 1. Introducción**
- 2. España en el panorama Europeo de las APTs**
- 3. Evolución de las tácticas. Ejemplos recientes**
  - a. Intel Case Study I. APT 29 – HAMMERTOSS**
  - b. Intel Case Study II. WITCHCOVEN**
- 4. Conclusiones**

2014


**APT Detection**  
Country Analysis

**Compromise Strategy**  
Risk Perspective

Therefore...



- |                         |                |
|-------------------------|----------------|
| 1. United Kingdom (17%) | 6. Italy (6%)  |
| 2. Germany (12%)        | 7. Qatar (5%)  |
| 3. Saudi Arabia (10%)   | 8. France (4%) |
| 4. Turkey (9%)          | 9. Sweden (4%) |
| 5. Switzerland (8%)     | 10. Spain (3%) |



**Malware map mimics economic and politics map..**


**Conventional malware remains effective..**

**Attackers increased in number but not in skills..**



2015

**APT Detection**  
Country Analysis



- |                       |                  |
|-----------------------|------------------|
| 1. Israel (11%)       | 6. Italy (9%)    |
| 2. Saudi Arabia (11%) | 7. Denmark (6%)  |
| <b>3. Spain (10%)</b> | 8. Turkey (6%)   |
| 4. Germany (10%)      | 9. Norway (5%)   |
| 5. France (10%)       | 10. Denmark (5%) |

**Compromise Strategy**  
Risk Perspective

200% Unique attacks



LV/NJRat  
Dridex  
Modified RAT tools  
....

60% "New-old" techniques



Dridex  
APT.NS01  
....

5% "Unseen" techniques..



WitchCoven  
APT29  
....

Therefore...


Attacks increased x2.  
Spain is main player..

Again malware map mimics  
economic and politics map..

Attackers evolve on  
procedures and tactics..




## Intel Case Study I: July 2015 – APT 29 - HAMMERTOSS



- We track their activities in **early 2015**.
- Unique mix of “already seen” techniques
- **Dynamic CnC by tweeter post.**
- **Steganography** on valid images
- **PowerShell scripting to Cloud storage.**

# STAGE 1:

## The Communication Process Begins with Twitter



## STAGE 2:

Tweeting a URL, Minimum File Size of an Image, and Part of an Encryption Key



If APT29's operator has registered that particular day's handle, he will tweet a URL and hashtag.

**URL:** In the case above, the tweet instructs HAMMERTOSS to download the content hosted at the specified URL, including any images on the page. In the example we will discuss later, the tweet included a URL on GitHub.




**Hashtag:** The tweet also contains a hashtag with information to allow HAMMERTOSS to extract encrypted instructions from an image file. The hashtag indicates that the hidden data is offset 101 bytes into the image file and the characters to be used for decryption are *docto*.


## STAGE 3: Visiting GitHub to Download an Image



APT29's operator registers a GitHub page and uploads an image.



# STAGE 4: APT29 Employs Basic Steganography



# STAGE 5: Executing Commands and Uploading Victim Data



APT29's operator creates the cloud storage account and can obtain the victim's data from the cloud storage service.




2. HAMMERTOSS is capable of uploading victim data to a cloud storage service.



```
C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe
Microsoft Windows XP [Version 5.1.2600]
(C) Copyright 1985-2001 Microsoft Corp.
C:\Documents and Settings\Cay>
```


1. HAMMERTOSS may issue other follow on commands:  
powershell -ExecutionPolicy bypass -WindowStyle hidden -

## Intel Case Study II: 2015 – WITCHCOVEN



- We track their activities in **during 1 Year**.
- **Selective compromised 100+ websites** as part of their infrastructure.
- **Scripts and freeware** as infection tools
- **Massive computing of profiling (CRM)**

....**E-commerce techniques** with total different purposes...





## “SUPERCOOKIE”

---

open source tool “evercookie”..

designed to create “**extremely persistent cookies**”

**alternate storage methods** not accessible by common users



Targeted Exploitation..



Spear Phishing..




Human Intelligence...

the user's IP address

browser type and version (via the User-Agent header)

browser language settings (via the Accept-Language header)

how a visitor arrived at the site (via the Referer header)



## Conclusions...

Conventional malware is still effective...

No clear “target/no target” attack differentiation by tool..

Malware grows to “legal” CnC infrastructure and freeware.

Intelligence plays HUGE role on risk attribution.

...

Spain is in the “match”...

## ➤ E-Mails

- [info@ccn-cert.cni.es](mailto:info@ccn-cert.cni.es)
- [ccn@cni.es](mailto:ccn@cni.es)
- [sondas@ccn-cert.cni.es](mailto:sondas@ccn-cert.cni.es)
- [redsara@ccn-cert.cni.es](mailto:redsara@ccn-cert.cni.es)
- [organismo.certificacion@cni.es](mailto:organismo.certificacion@cni.es)

## ➤ Websites

- [www.ccn.cni.es](http://www.ccn.cni.es)
- [www.ccn-cert.cni.es](http://www.ccn-cert.cni.es)
- [www.oc.ccn.cni.es](http://www.oc.ccn.cni.es)



Síguenos en Linked in

